Iraq's Bioweapons Not a Reason For War

In the months leading up to November's mid-term elections, the Bush Administration sought and received Congressional authorization to wage a pre-emptive war against Iraq. The United States has informed the United Nations that it will not hesitate to take unilateral action against Saddam Hussein, despite the fact that doing so would undermine the foundations of international law -- in particular, the UN Charter prohibition against unprovoked military aggression. A war against Iraq is certain to be costly and protracted, kill thousands of people, divert an estimated $200 billion dollars from crucial domestic social programs, threaten international security, and provoke further violence.

Much of the rhetoric calling for Saddam Hussein’s immediate removal has emphasized the threat of Iraq’s biological weapons to U.S. security, a claim the Administration has yet to substantiate. The Council for Responsible Genetics (CRG) is profoundly concerned that these premature claims are being used as justification for war. Several CIA officials, along with the former lead U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq, have expressed dismay at both the lack of information and the administration's attempt to quell all intelligence that does not support its political goals. Until United Nations investigators are allowed to examine Iraq's military infrastructure, we cannot presume that Saddam Hussein has either the ability to manufacture biological weapons or to use them effectively in the near future.

Meanwhile, Congress plans to allocate $6 billion in new funding to the US biological defense program. The same projects that help us to understand and create vaccines against biological weapons are, actively and unintentionally, used for their development and deployment. Investigators have provided compelling evidence that the anthrax used in last fall's mail attacks came from military laboratories in the United States. It has also been revealed that thousands of citizens were exposed to biological weapons during testing on U.S. soil during the 1960's and 70's. Moreover, weapons derived from cultures of botulinum, brucella, and anthrax bacteria, supplied to Saddam Hussein by the American Type Culture Collection in the early 1980's, may now be used against our troops. All this points to one thing: biological warfare "defense" is a threat to our own citizens, as well as to potential enemy populations.

While disarming Iraq may be a necessary goal, it must be undertaken as part of a comprehensive International arms control policy. U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, which the current Administration has used to justify the disarmament of Saddam Hussein, calls on all states in the Middle East region, including Israel, to adhere to a ban on chemical and biological weapons, and to set up a regional nuclear-free zone. President Bush and his advisors have consistently ignored the scope of this resolution. Other decisions, including Bush’s rejection of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) -- a treaty created under the Nixon Administration, with 162 signatories, that bans the “development, production and stockpiling” of biological weapons -- have undermined America’s security and its authority to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

For the last two decades, CRG has argued for an end to the development and use of biological weapons. The best solution to current and future security threats is a globally enforceable biological weapons regime that puts both the activities of all governments, including the United States, and of relevant private industries under close scrutiny. Since the line between offense and defense in this context is thin to non-existent, no loopholes should be justified it terms of “defense.”

The United States and other nations must improve systems of healthcare delivery and global disease surveillance if they are to respond effectively to potential biological weapons attacks. The ability to rapidly detect artificial disease outbreaks when they occur is crucial to the preparedness of our clinics and hospitals. But early warnings are difficult to catch. Under a health care system where medical treatment is a right, not an expensive privilege, people are more likely to contact their physicians at the first sign of sickness. This potential to safeguard biological security should add urgency to current discussion of healthcare reform.

Instead of advancing biological disarmament through international cooperation, the Bush administration has resorted to harmful and coercive unilateral measures. CRG therefore calls for the resumption of “full access” U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq, based on the French proposal that the U.S. return to the U.N. Security Council for further consultation if such inspections should fail to achieve disarmament. CRG also calls on the United States to ratify the verification and enforcement protocols of the BWC and extend the Convention to cover all genetic modification of biological agents for military purposes.