There’s Precedent for Stopping Biodefense Lab
By Felix D. Arroyo
Boston Herald , Op-Ed
February 8, 2006

Last week, Boston University received final U.S. approval for a Level 4 federal biodefense laboratory. While it may appear to be a defeat for those opposing this lab, Bostonians must remember that until the lab is up and running, it can and should be stopped.

Those of us who continue to oppose this project must remember the precedent from across the river. In the 1970s and 1980s, Cambridge faced public concern over high-security research, resulting in a citizens advisory committee that recommended that the research be prohibited. This decision was upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.

Even so, Cambridge remains an international beacon of scientific research. Indeed, Cambridge hosts more than 50 major biotech companies and more than half of the state’s top 25 biotechnology research and development firms.

Cambridge does not stand alone in its success. Outraged locals succeeded in keeping a Level 4 component of a laboratory from going into operation in a Toronto suburb, even after the building was constructed.

Where is our outrage? At what price are we selling the safety of our citizens? For the creation of fewer than 1,000 jobs, many of them temporary, that in the long run are likely to not be filled by neighborhood residents?

Level 4 agents are defined as dangerous/exotic agents that pose high risk of life-threatening disease, aerosol-transmitted lab infections or related agents with unknown risk of transmission. We must not forget the BU Medical Center’s track record. Since the biolab was announced, four BU lab workers contracted tularemia.

Mistakes happen. In 2004, a leaky aerosol chamber built by the University of Wisconsin was responsible for three laboratory-acquired tuberculosis infections in Seattle, at what is an even less risky Level 3 lab. We do not have enough knowledge to say that these mistakes won’t happen, and that if they do, Boston is prepared to handle them.

Some proponents have said that since the city has adopted an evacuation plan — which has never even been tested — that subjecting our residents to bioterrorism is not a risk. I fail to see the logic of people suspected of contracting anthrax or ebola fleeing the city. Safety in this case is a matter of quarantine, not of displacing people and pathogens that already have caused harm.

The Bush administration announced the expansion of Biosafety Level 4 capacity at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta and the U.S. Army Research Institute on Infectious Diseases, the latter being the only Level 4 laboratory now under military protection. Why create new centers for risk when the former ones are doing the same type of work?

Local residents, not Washington, must rule if the lab’s location is OK. Federal approval merely signifies a new step in our fight to preserve Boston’s health and safety. Local and state officials must stand together to protect our health and safety. We must have the strength to loudly, clearly and repeatedly refuse to let our constituents come so closely into harm’s way.
    

Felix Arroyo is a member of the Boston City Council.