An Open Letter to the Leadership of the Boston University National Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefenses

March 17, 2003

Mark S. Klempner, M.D.
Assistant Provost for Research
Boston University Medical Campus

Conrad Wesselhoeft Professor of Medicine
Vice Chair for Research
Department of Medicine
715 Albany Street
Boston, MA 02118

Dear Dr. Klempner,

The current expansion of research on biological weapons agents raises important challenges to our nation’s safety and security, as well as our commitment to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Chief among these issues is the need to ensure full public transparency and disclosure of research conducted at Biosafety Level (BSL) 3 and 4 laboratories. Secrecy prevents local residents, policymakers, and the international community from evaluating the risks of biological weapons research. Handling dangerous pathogens creates grave risks: domestic terrorism, exposure of researchers to infectious disease, and accidents caused by breakdowns in biological containment. The recent failure of containment systems at the Plum Island infectious disease laboratory should indicate the severity of these safety concerns.

Classified biodefense experiments raise suspicions at home and abroad. In particular, there is widespread concern that offensive capabilities will be produced in the process of vaccine development and other defensive work. Such concerns can only be allayed if these projects are openly declared. Our nation’s credibility and leadership on international arms control is undermined by initiatives that bring into question the integrity of our commitments. Secrecy sets a dangerous precedent for other countries considering undisclosed research, potentially triggering a destructive cycle of covert biological weapons development.

Though the United States renounced biological weapons by ratifying the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC) nearly three decades ago, the Bush Administration in 2001 blocked the creation of a multilateral inspection system for laboratories such as the proposed BU National Center for Biodefense. The decision of the U.S. to reject international declaration of its biodefense activities has angered our closest allies, and increased the burden on non-governmental organizations to provide oversight of domestic treaty compliance in the midst of a deteriorating arms control situation.

The United States’ derailment of the BWC Verification Protocol was shortly followed by dramatic reports in the New York Times and Baltimore Sun of secret and highly provocative US activities, including the construction of an anthrax production plant in Nevada, the genetic engineering of anthrax to evade existing vaccines, and the manufacture of biological submunition (bomblet) prototypes. While these experiments are described as defense, a number of experts in biological weapons control and former government officials have publicly stated their belief that U.S. rejection of the declaration and inspection of biodefense facilities is, in fact, due to new, classified U.S. programs that violate the BWC. Though your institution may give a good faith pledge to not conduct research that could be construed as offensive, conducting any secret research levels suspicion upon your institution.

We understand that Boston University’s National Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefenses does not propose to conduct biological weapons experiments that violate international law. However, in the context of America’s rejection of inspections and conduct of classified experiments with biological weapons agents, greater assurances and mechanisms of accountability must be available to citizens and the international public.

The BU Medical Center claims on its website that it “has been reaching out to community leaders, business leaders and others local residents to open communications about the [biodefense] project and address any concerns.” The Council for Responsible Genetics is not convinced of the sincerity of this commitment. First, there have been no public meetings scheduled for surrounding neighborhoods, and citizens of the wider Boston region, to voice their concerns about the proposed BSL 4 construction project. Second, the “surveys” of surrounding residents that BU Medical Center has used to bolster its claim of community support for the laboratory are misleading and unscientific. Respondents report being promised, with little substantiation, that the laboratory would protect the health of the city in the case of a bioterrorist attack. The citizens of Boston deserve to be brought into an honest and open dialogue over the potential costs and benefits of this facility, not merely bombarded with an aggressive propaganda campaign.

It is critical that the public have full access to information on the activities scheduled to be conducted at the new BSL 4 facility. The BU National Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefenses will be one of the first such laboratories to be located in a major urban area. Given these concerns, neighboring cities have already passed ordinances to explicitly prevent BSL 4 research. Without the availability of complete
information, it will be impossible for all parties involved to make an adequate assessment of the costs and benefits of the current proposal. In light of the local and international uncertainties on the nature and advisability of US biodefense research, public trust and accountability must be established through a more explicit and unequivocal commitment.

We therefore call up on you, as the Assistant Provost for Research, to commit your laboratory, in writing, to the following safeguards:

1. That under no circumstances will any classified research be conducted by any BU National Center for Biodefense researcher or any person granted access to your laboratory;

2. That the BU Medical Center will maintain a fully transparent Biosafety Committee that will review and approve/disapprove all projects to be conducted in the BL3 and BL4 facilities, and that all Biosafety Committee documentation will be made concurrently available to the entire public, and that any member of the public will have the right to attend all portions of all committee meetings;

3. That the BU National Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefenses will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of all experiments conducted in the BSL 3/ BSL 4 facilities to include the names of the investigators, a copy of the research proposal, and a detailed description of the procedures conducted, including results and the scientific names and quantities of all agent(s) utilized including, when applicable, descriptions of any transformants used;

4. That the BU National Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefenses will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of all agents entering or exiting the lab and an up-to-date account of all organisms, and quantities thereof, present in the laboratory;

5. That in order to promote public understanding of its activities and to ensure public health, the BU National Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefenses will maintain an online or publicly-inspectable record of the complete vaccination status of all persons with access to the laboratory.

Your laboratory is one of more than three dozen new BSL 3 and BSL 4 labs presently proposed for construction or upgrading in the United States. The undersigned organizations are seeking similar commitments from other laboratory proponents. By making this pledge in writing and without qualifications, the BU Medical Center can begin the process of establishing public trust and accountability.

Please send your response to Peter Shorett, Director of Programs, Council for Responsible Genetics, 5 Upland Road, Suite 3, Cambridge, MA 02140. Phone (617) 868-0870, Fax: (617) 491-5344.

Sincerely,

Sujatha Byravan, Ph.D., Executive Director
Peter Shorett, Director of Programs
Council for Responsible Genetics
Cambridge, MA

Edward Hammond, Director
The Sunshine Project
Austin, TX

Robert K. Musil, Ph.D, M.P.H, Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Washington, DC

Winston Weeks, Research Specialist
Citizens Education Project
Salt Lake City, UT

Greg Mello, Director
Los Alamos Study Group
Santa Fe, NM

Marylia Kelley, Executive Director
Tri-Valley CAREs
(Communities Against a Radioactive Environment)
Livermore, CA

Mary Wulff, Coordinator
Coalition for a Safe Lab
Hamilton, MT

Colin King, Research Director
Nuclear Watch of New Mexico
Santa Fe, NM

Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director
Andrew Lichterman, Program Director
Western States Legal Foundation
Oakland, CA

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