BU's Four-Part Failure
by Marc Pelletier

The recent outbreak of tularemia at Boston University’s Biosafety Level 2 (BSL2) laboratory is not worrisome because it led to the infection of the general public. Thankfully, such a situation did not occur. The outbreak infected three lab workers at the BU facility itself, and as tularemia is not spread from human to human, they did not pose a public health risk. However, this incident is worrisome because it gives us insight into how BU operates and manages its labs that work with bioterrorism agents.

The experiments done with tularemia are similar to the experiments BU plans on conducting in their proposed BSL4 lab, but those will involve much more deadly organisms. Fortunately, BU revealed its inadequacies while working with this less infectious agent. They were caught running with round-tipped scissors. This does not change the fact that BU experienced a complete breakdown of biosafety protocols with a relatively mild and curable strain of bacteria, yet it claims to be ready to work with deadly, incurable organisms. The tularemia outbreak has proved that BU is not ready.

The infection of the three researchers with tularemia is an example of the total collapse of biosafety and biosecurity in a BU facility. The systems failed on at least four levels. The first was, by BU’s admission, a disregard by the researchers of established safety protocols. Simply put, it was a typical case of people taking shortcuts. This can happen in any setting, regardless of the gravity of the situation. A safety plan that does not take into account the unpredictable human element is not a plan based on reality.

The second breakdown in biosafety was the fact that the researchers did not, in fact, realize that they were working with an infectious strain of the bacteria. They assumed that they were working with a mild strain that could not infect them. Unfortunately, they were wrong. This human error was a factor in the researchers’ failure to comply with the safety protocols that demand the use of a HEPA filtration system when working with such organisms.

Mistaking an infectious form of an organism for a non-infectious one could have had catastrophic results, including the worst-case scenario for the accidental spread of disease. Imagine if these researchers accidentally exposed themselves to Ebola or plague and then walked out into downtown Boston.

The third breakdown was that researchers contracted the disease that they had been working on without anyone in the facility noticing. This is similar to the researchers in China who originally contracted SARS. Again, the consequences of this outbreak could have been far worse if the BU researchers had contracted an airborne disease in the manner their Chinese counterparts did.

Finally, the fourth breakdown occurred when BU officials failed to comply with state regulations that require them to report any suspicion of infection with specified bioterrorism agents. It is not up to the discretion of BU or the mayor of Boston to decide if the infection warrants public notification any more than it is up to the discretion of researchers whether or not to work with tularemia in a biological safety cabinet. BU officials knowingly suppressed information about the outbreak because they did not want to jeopardize approval of the new BSL4 lab. This action does not inspire confidence.

This multilateral breakdown in security procedures is evidence that BU and city officials are more interested in furthering their pet projects than they are in protecting public safety.

Marc Pelletier, M. Sc. is a biochemist in the Boston biotech sector. He has spent the last 20 years in labs in Boston and Berlin, working on projects in the fields of immunology and infectious disease.