Boston Residents Should Decide Future of Biolab

by Sujatha Byravan & Sheldon Krimsky

(A shortened version of this appeared in the November 2003 South End News.)

There was mixed emotion in the city when it was announced that Boston University Medical Center (BU) won the bid for a federal biodefense lab. The project, which is expected to garner $1.6 billion for construction and research over the next two decades, will include space for a Biosafety Level 4 (BL4) laboratory designed for research on organisms that cause diseases for which there is no known cure. While supporters applaud the potential for new jobs and vaccines, community groups have opposed the project. Among their chief complaints has been the lack of transparency and accountability and the charge that BU has circumvented the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) by not completing an environmental impact review.

From the beginning, the university’s application to the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) has been cloaked in secrecy. BU’s unwillingness to share details about a facility that will handle some of the most dangerous pathogens known to science (it has not provided its application to community members) and the lack of open public engagement have created a climate of suspicion and distrust.

Boston can benefit from the experience of its neighbor, Cambridge, on fostering democratic engagement in the face of controversial scientific research. In 1976, when the City of Cambridge faced public concern about new high -security research facilities at Harvard and MIT, a citizens committee was appointed by the city manager to study the matter and make recommendations. The Cambridge Experimentation Review Board (CERB), composed mainly of laypersons from the city, organized a number of hearings to debate the issues. City officials provided opportunities for discussion of laboratory safety and scientific accountability. The outcome of those public deliberations included the creation of a biosafety committee and a prohibition against BL4 research as too risky for a densely populated community.

A second Cambridge controversy over high-security research in the mid-1980s involved a new laboratory built by Arthur D. Little (ADL) to undertake federally-sponsored work on toxic chemical warfare agents. Once again the city set up a citizen’s advisory committee, which unanimously recommended that the research be prohibited – a decision upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Court.

Four steps must be taken to allow Bostonians a similar opportunity to learn about the proposed high containment lab through public debate. First, residents must have access to the federal proposal describing the facility, the types of research to be undertaken in it, and whether such research falls under the new Homeland Security secrecy guidelines. Second, the city should set up a citizens’ committee to review potential risks, alleged economic benefits, liability for accidents, and appropriate oversight of the safety of such a facility. Third, a risk and impact assessment should be conducted under the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) by people who do not have a vested interest in the laboratory. Currently, information about accidents in the several other biodefense laboratories has not been made public.

We are aware, for example, that in 2002 there was a three-hour power failure (including backup generators) in the Plum Island Biosafety Level 3 facility. The media reported that windows at the facility were sealed with duct tape. At Fort Detrick, one of the nation’s oldest BL4 facilities, workers have tested positive for exposure to anthrax, numerous biological agents including Ebola and anthrax went unaccounted for in the early 1990s, and a hazardous waste cleanup uncovered more than 100 vials from the laboratory, many with live bacteria and some with anthrax. Accidents have also occurred in transit. For instance, in 2003 a package with West Nile virus exploded in a Federal Express facility in Columbus, Ohio. Over the years, there have been reports of infected workers in several Level 3 facilities.

The community must have access to investigations of accidents in high containment laboratories similar to that planned for BU. Once citizens can make a fair assessment of the risks and benefits of such a facility, and if they should reach the conclusion that it is appropriate to be sited in the area planned, then they can work on a risk management plan to ensure that the facility is under civilian control with strong community oversight.

Sujatha Byravan, PhD. Executive Director, Council for Responsible Genetics

Sheldon Krimsky, PhD., Professor, Department of Urban & Environmental Policy & Planning, Tufts University