South End News | November 2003

Boston Residents Should Decide Future of Biolab

by Sujatha Byravan & Sheldon Krimsky

(What appeared is a shortened version of this editorial.)

There was mixed emotion when Boston University Medical Center (BU) won the bid for a federal biodefense lab. The project, to garner $1.6 billion in construction and research funds over the next two decades, will include a Biosafety Level 4 (BSL4) laboratory for researching organisms that cause diseases for which there is no known cure. While supporters applaud the potential for new jobs and vaccines, some community groups have opposed the project. Among their chief complaints are a lack of transparency and accountability on the part of BU, and a charge that BU has circumvented the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) by not completing an environmental impact review.

Boston can benefit from the experience of its neighbor, Cambridge, on fostering democratic engagement in the face of controversial scientific research. In 1976, when the public was concerned about new, high-security research facilities at Harvard and MIT, a citizens committee was appointed to study the matter and make recommendations. The Cambridge Experimentation Review Board (CERB), composed mainly of laypersons, organized hearings to debate the issues. City officials provided opportunities for discussion of laboratory safety and scientific accountability. The outcome of those public deliberations included the creation of a biosafety committee and a prohibition against BSL4 research, deemed too risky for a densely populated community.

In the mid-1980s, a second Cambridge controversy arose. A new laboratory was built by Arthur D. Little (ADL) to undertake federally-sponsored work on toxic chemical warfare agents. Once again the city set up a citizen's advisory committee, which unanimously recommended that the research be prohibited - a decision upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Court.

Four steps must be taken to allow Bostonians a similar opportunity. First, residents must have access to the federal proposal describing the facility, the types of research to be undertaken, and whether such research falls under the new Homeland Security secrecy guidelines. Second, the city should set up a citizens' committee to review potential risks, alleged economic benefits, liability for accidents, and appropriate oversight. Third, a risk and impact assessment should be conducted under the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) by people who do not have a vested interest in the laboratory. Fourth, the community must have access to investigations of accidents (for a list of these go to www.gene-watch.org ) in other high containment laboratories. Once citizens can make a fair assessment of the risks and benefits of such a facility, and if they should reach the conclusion that it is appropriate to be sited in the area planned, then they can work on a risk management plan to ensure that the facility is under civilian control with strong community oversight.

Sujatha Byravan, PhD. Executive Director, Council for Responsible Genetics

Sheldon Krimsky, PhD., Professor, Department of Urban & Environmental Policy & Planning, Tufts University and Board Member of the Council for Responsible Genetics