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Mistakes Happen: Accidents
and Security Breaches at Biocontainment Laboratories
Council for Responsible Genetics, 2005
Introduction
Every day, thousands of laboratories in the United States
handle potentially dangerous viruses, bacteria, and other
microbes. Guidelines for required equipment, handling practices,
facility layout, and other procedures are used to ensure the
safety of researchers and the public health. At all biosafety
levels, however—from the minimal containment of
the common wet lab to the airtight boxes, full-body suits and supply and exhaust vacuums of high-security facilities—accidents
are inevitable.
The Council for Responsible Genetics has conducted an ongoing
survey of accidents and security breakdowns at high-security
biological research facilities that have occurred over the
last decade. The results of this survey included examples
of each the following incidents:
- loss of (or inability to account for) significant quantities
of bioterrorism agents stored in biocontainment laboratories;
- infection of laboratory personnel with a dangerous pathogen,
resulting in serious illness or death;
- failure of key safeguards and containment measures following
a security inspection or power failure;
- use of bioterrorism agents removed from a biocontainment
facility for the purposes of causing indiscriminate harm
to civilians.
Since the late 1990s, a rapid expansion of funding
for biological defense research has resulted in the proliferation
of Biosafety Level 3 and 4 laboratories to handle some of
the world’s most dangerous diseases, including anthrax,
plague, ebola, and tularemia.
Many advocates claim that accidents rarely, if ever, occur
at Biosafety Level 3 and 4 facilities. In fact, the frequency
of such incidents is widely disputed, given a lack of comprehensive
federal reporting guidelines for laboratory exposures/infections,
breaches of security, or environmental releases from microbiological
and biomedical laboratories.
Reporting of Laboratory Accidents: Relevant Laws and Guidelines
When a member of laboratory personnel is infected with one
of a select number of potentially dangerous biological agents,
that institution may be required by state law to immediately
report the infection. While the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) maintains a list of 49 “notifiable
diseases,” the specific diseases which require notification
of health authorities are determined on a state-to-state basis.
Reporting of infections to the CDC remains mandatory. Most
states have implemented legislation mandating immediate reporting
of diseases that pose a significant public health threat,
including potential bioterrorism agents.
Voluntary reports of laboratory infections received by the
CDC are published in the Mortality
and Morbidity Weekly Report. Our accident survey revealed
that while most, but not all, serious laboratory infections
have publicly documented by the CDC, personnel exposures are
much less well-documented. For example, following several
laboratory-based anthrax exposures, the CDC failed to report
the incidents in its weekly publication.
Other categories of accidents at biodefense laboratories—including
security breaches, possible theft of biological materials,
and environmental releases—are closely guarded secrets,
revealed only through investigative journalism and, to a lesser
extent, through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) inquiries.
The Bioterrorism Act of 2002 (PL 107-188) prohibits the public
disclosure of any theft or loss of a potential bioterrorism
agent, as well as any information related to site-specific
security measures designed to prevent unauthorized access
to biological agents. Although reporting of releases and thefts
of bioterrorism agents from laboratories are mandatory, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services may only provide public
notification if the incident represents a serious public health
emergency.
Many thanks to Elizabeth Constable
for her help in documenting these cases.
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